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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Maine dreaming: Succession and lasting legacies 
The burden of Russian history, coupled with certain well-known group dynamics, 
does not bode well for President Putin or Russia over the course of the coming 
year.  Given all the ink spilled and band width consumed over succession 
already, the fact that interest in the topic will only increase causes the mind to 
boggle, and yet it is clear that every facet of Russia's approaching 
constitutionally-mandated transition is subject to microscopic examination: it 
ranges from the utterances of the president (are governors the new "it" successor 
group?) to the jostling of the primary tier of putative successors (would Medvedev 
or Ivanov be more inclined to broaden the re-nationalization process of key 
industries?) to the sheer (and exuberant) speculation of possible "dark horse" 
candidates.  It is clear that Russia-watching and Kremlinology have become little 
more than an unblinking gaze off toward the horizon, waiting for the crown of the 
next Russian leader to cast its shadow as signal that the succession at last has 
begun. (1) 
 
One fact is evident at this moment in the succession guessing game:  Whatever 
direction Putin chooses, he could build support easily for his decision among 
both the general Russian population and the elite.    Putin is on the cusp between 
the end of his constitutional administration and the start of another regime:  His 
options are many, but time is not on his side.  As the media focus on his 
successors, the spotlight is beginning to move away from Putin.  If he is to take 
initiative either to solidify the governing system he has established or to upend 
that system, the window of opportunity is open for only a few months.  For now, 
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Putin still commands the attention of the media (perhaps more literally than one 
would wish), and he appears to remain extremely popular.  For months, if not 
years, Putin has been questioned on his choice of successor; perhaps this is a 
proper moment to expand on that theme and ask what kind of inheritance Putin 
hopes to leave for his successor. 
 
Putin's visit to the Bush compound in Maine would seem a logical time to reflect 
on his legacy.  Perhaps Bush père could introduce a conversation on the difficult 
necessity of walking away when your time in office is up, and the equally difficult 
recognition that your advice is not always welcomed by your successors.  
Successors, no matter how close, will not always heed your admonitions or 
follow the path you cleared, nor should they.   If Putin seriously was 
contemplating the so-called "placeholder" succession option, a frank 
conversation with the Bushes (or even a review of the problems of regency in 
Russian history) should disabuse him of that notion's allure. (2) 
 
Perhaps a reflection on the importance of institutions and respect for established 
traditions in a mature democracy will prompt Putin to devise a means of inspiring 
Russia's citizenry to participate and trust in the governing system.  As a starting 
point, Putin could use his last few months in office to tackle the negative aspects 
of the current Russian system, particularly the complicated and intertwined 
issues of bloated executive power, a weak judiciary and ill-defined legal code, as 
well as system-wide corruption.  These are all issues Putin addressed earlier in 
his presidency through Dmitri Kozak.  (3) Perhaps a renewed effort to follow 
through on the reforms, monitor implementation or take a new tack would signal 
a commitment to improving ordinary Russian lives, as well as Russia's standing 
in the international community.  Such efforts likely would prove far more inspiring 
than the chest thumping insistence on Russia's great power status at 
international gatherings, or a foreign policy that subsumes long range 
imperatives under an attempt to build "multi-polarity" in the short term. 
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Given the opportunity and willingness to expend his political capital, Putin also 
could make great strides in the development of viable political parties in Russia.  
While it might be preferable to see the grass roots development of parties, 
Russia has struggled with this aspect of democratic development.  Perhaps Putin 
could support the consolidation and creation of two, or three, or even four 
genuine political parties with distinct credos and abdicate the choice of Kremlin 
successor to an electoral horse race among the candidates chosen by their 
parties.  By establishing an electoral precedent for the transfer of executive 
power in Russia, Putin could begin to overcome a longstanding historical 
deficiency in Russian political progress.  (4) 
 
Russian politicians, perhaps most notably the "democrats" and "liberal reformers" 
of the 1990s frequently have cautioned against placing trust in the Russian 
electorate for fear of the rise of a chauvinistic, xenophobic, and violently 
nationalistic movement.  While this scenario does represent a nightmare for 
Russia, and its neighbors in particular, the power of such a political bogeyman 
could be tempered by political reforms that reverse the trend toward the "power 
vertical" and force a balance between legislative and executive powers. 
 
There is one overarching issue that Putin must address regardless of the 
approach he takes toward the end of his constitutional term:  the status of the 
Kremlin apparatchiki and their entanglement with Russia's largest, and most 
profitable, corporations.  There is but one question Putin needs to answer that 
will make clear whether Russia will progress along a course (perhaps even its 
own, "sovereign" path) of democratic development or be sucked into a sinkhole 
of corruption and oligarchic domination:  Will the current Kremlin officeholders 
retain their positions on the boards of the major companies in the oil, gas, 
precious metals, arms sales, electricity and other industries?  Will their positions 
pass ex officio to the next crop of Kremlin apparatchiki?  Or will the last few 
months of Putin's constitutional presidency see the disentanglement of public 
officials from corporate positions?  
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It is in the interests of the vast Kremlin and wider government bureaucracy to 
militate for a continuation of the current system:  The Yel'tsin to Putin transition 
saw oligarchs of the 1990s stripped of their holdings, forced into exile or jailed.   
A new transition poses considerable risks for the circles of advisors, allies, 
friends, associates and supporters around Putin; one way to mitigate the risk is to 
promote a continuation of Putin's regime by any means.  If constitutional change 
is off the table, then the selection of a successor regime by the current regime 
presents current office holders with the least objectionable alternative – their 
challenge soon becomes simply to back the right horse in the race.  
 
If Putin, with a little distance and enough consideration given to his legacy, can 
see beyond the Kremlin walls, perhaps Russia will find a more successful path to 
stability coupled with consolidation of its democratic development. 
 
It is possible, unfortunately, that Putin's historic visit to the Bush compound in 
Maine will be characterized less by the quality of the conversation, than by the 
political show demonstrated by the consumption of Maine's finest lobsters and 
blueberry pie, and by Russian good will "earned" by US concessions, while the 
sale of Russian missiles continues to states that seek to destabilize their regions 
and threaten innocent lives. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) There is a wide variety of articles on possible succession scenarios.  See, for 
example, "Putin says 4-year Term is Too Short, The Moscow Times, 5 Jun 07; 
Independent Press via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe; "Russian website hints at 
Governors likely to bid for presidency," Gazeta.ru; BBC Monitoring International 
Reports via Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe; "Putin Will be Silent," 14 Jun 07, 
Vedomosti; Agency What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis Academic 
Universe. 
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(2) See "Puzzling over Putin's Remarks on Succession: Russian Leader Hints at 
Place-Holder," by Peter Finn, Washington Post. 23 Jun 07 via Johnson's Russia 
List (JRL), 25 Jun 07. 
(3) For details on the various "Kozak reforms," please see previous issues of The 
NIS Observed, searchable at www.bu.edu/iscip. 
(4) On the topic of the Yel'tsin era "deal" on the scope of politics, see Interview 
with Garry Kasparov, by Jordan Timm, Macleans (Canada), 25 Jun 07 via JRL, 
2007-141, 26 Jun 07.  On the topic of succession, see Flawed Succession: 
Russia's Power Transfer Crises, Ed. by Uri Ra'anan, Rowman-Littlefield 
(Lexington Books), 2006. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Creela Henderson 
 
Reemergence of the Democratic Party of Russia 
For all its authoritarian behavior, there is no clearer illustration of the Putin 
government’s subversion of democracy than the revival of the long-defunct 
Democratic Party of Russia. While a rag-tag coalition of opposition parties was 
harassed and arrested at peaceful demonstrations on the streets of Moscow and 
St. Petersburg, President Putin addressed a cordial letter to the Democratic Party 
of Russia (DPR) in honor of Russian Independence Day, congratulating the party 
on its good work and wishing it continued success in the future. (1) In the face of 
real, if meager, opposition, the Kremlin has set about creating another puppet 
party under the banner of democracy that is likely to confuse voters and to strip 
support from authentically democratic competitors. In about eight months, Putin’s 
presidency will come to an end. The changes in Russia’s party system that have 
taken place under his administration will have profound and lasting implications 
for Russian politics. 
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The original DPR has a proud tradition dating back to 1990, when it was created 
as a force of opposition to the hegemonic Communist Party. The party was 
founded by Nikolai Travkin, a prominent democratic figure who later switched to 
Yabloko and is presently a member of Mikhail Kasyanov’s National Democratic 
Party. During the attempted coup of August 1991, members of DPR were among 
the crowd defending the Russian President against the putschists. Demonstrably 
strong and popular, the party won 14 seats in the first State Duma, where its 
leaders served to shape the new, post-Communist Russia. Economist Sergei 
Glaziev headed the committee on economic policy and lawyer Sergei Zapolsky 
authored the first Civil Code of Russia. (2) The party did not survive the upheaval 
of post-perestroika politics, and by the second round of Duma elections in 1996, 
the party was largely defunct. 
 
Then, on May 14, 2007, the new leader of the DPR, Andrei Bogdanov, called a 
press conference to announce that his party was making a comeback with the 
goal of steering Russia into joining the European Union. (3) At a moment when 
relations between Russia and the West are fraught with tension, Bogdanov 
envisions a unification that will lead ultimately to Russia’s accession into NATO. 
Anton Goltsman, press secretary of the democratic opposition party Union of 
Right Forces (SPS), remarked upon the absurdity of the proposition, from a 
conventional Russian point of view: “The West is almost showering Russia with 
missiles fired from Poland and the Czech Republic, and they are saying, ‘Hey, 
let’s join them. Let’s join the enemy!’” (4) Bogdanov defends his plan by evoking 
nationalistic anxieties; joining NATO, he claims, is the only way that the country 
will be able to check an imminent Chinese invasion of Russia’s Far East. (5) His 
far-fetched international agenda is beside the point. Analysts suggest that the 
DPR is merely serving as a mouthpiece for the Kremlin, to convince Western 
powers that Russia is on their side, after all. (6) The press conference was a ploy 
to attract attention to the DPR and to broadcast the illusion that the party is a 
viable alternative to Russia’s beleaguered opposition forces. 
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The story of the reemergence of the DPR is a prosaic narrative of backroom 
deals leavened with hefty payoffs, but the Kremlin’s takeover of the party is 
largely a matter of luck and canny timing. After former Prime Minister Kasianov 
was relieved from office by Putin in 2004, he sought to revive his political career 
by pouring funds into the DPR, in order to remake the obsolete party into his 
personal political machine. As he prepared to assume the mantle of party 
leadership in December 2005, however, he found that he had been double-
crossed: outbid by an outside donor, who offered DPR officials $10,000 each to 
reject Kasyanov and elect Bogdanov in his stead. (7) Kasyanov railed against the 
Kremlin for stealing his election, but the DPR party carried on without him as a 
political party devoid of its own agenda, though it counts 80,000 members. (8) 
             
The DPR membership comes at the expense of the country’s genuinely 
democratic parties, SPS and Yabloko. The party’s website makes a point of its 
activities in regional elections, where support for democratic movements is 
significant. In 2006, SPS stood to gain 14% of the votes for the Kursk regional 
legislature, after 37% went to United Russia and 11% went to the Communist 
Party. Instead, DPR campaigned aggressively to split the vote in half – 7% to 
SPS, 7% to DPR. The battle for the regions continued in March 2007 in 
Krasnoyarsk, where SPS surprised pundits by winning a sizable 16% of the 
votes. The following month, DPR submitted false evidence accusing SPS of 
buying votes. The Interior Ministry raided the SPS Krasnoyarsk party 
headquarters, as a result of which the party suffered a severe loss of credibility 
within the local electorate. 
             
When it comes to dirty politics, the Kremlin already has secured notoriety for 
itself by quashing peaceful opposition rallies, beating demonstrators and jailing 
opponents. What is still more unseemly is the cynical propagation of puppet 
parties under the banner of democracy. How will Russian voters, already soured 
on the country’s experiment with democracy, have faith in the country’s political 
system when the very name “democracy” stands for nothing at all? 
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Source Notes: 
 
(1) Letter from President Putin via (www.democrats.ru).  
(2) History of DPR available from INDEM via 
(http://www.indem.ru/en/partarchiv.htm). 
(3) “Russia's Democratic Party rebounds with EU goal,” Agence France Presse – 
English, 14 May 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Levine, Yasha, “Reintroducing: The Democratic Party of Russia: A case study 
in virtual politics,” The eXile, 15 Jun 07 via (www.exile.ru). 
(5) DPR platform available via (www.democrats.ru). 
(6) “Russia's Democratic Party rebounds with EU goal,” Agence France Presse – 
English, 14 May 07 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) “’Putin foe’ leadership bid fails,” BBC News, 17 Dec 05 via 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4538166.stm). 
(8) DPR data available via (www.democrats.ru). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Did the SVR deliver General Djordjevic? 
 Vlastimir Djordjevic is a former Serbian Police General, who served in the 
separatist province of Kosovo. Since 1999, Djordjevic has remained on the “most 
wanted” list published by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia. At time of the Kosovo crisis, he was Head of the RJP (Serbia’s 
Public Security Service) and Assistant Interior Minister. (1)  
    
According to the Tribunal’s Indictment, Djordjevic is “criminally responsible under 
his de jure/and or de facto authority” for the crimes committed by his 
subordinates. These crimes constituted “operations targeting the Kosovo 
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Albanians with the objective of expelling a substantial portion of the Kosovo 
Albanian population from Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control 
over the province.” (2) Djordjevic’s units allegedly were responsible for mass 
rapes, murder and the “destruction of ethnic Albanian and Muslim cultural and 
religious monuments” in Kosovo. His units supposedly caused some 800,000 
civilians to flee the province. (3)  
 
At the end of the NATO intervention, Djordjevic, along with a number of other 
Serbian military commanders wanted by the tribunal, went on the run. At various 
moments, Djordjevic was thought by Carla Del Ponte (the Tribunal’s Prosecutor), 
to be hiding in Russia (4) and in Budva, Montenegro. (5)  
   
In mid-June, Sergei Lebedev, head of the SVR (Russia’s Foreign Intelligence 
Service) conducted an official visit to Montenegro –where he visited Budva. 
Within days of his visit, Djordjevic had been arrested, and handed over to the 
United Nations Tribunal. Although there is no official confirmation of his 
intervention, some reports have suggested that Lebedev’s visit and the arrest 
were connected. (6) 
    
Both Russia and Serbia, its traditional ally, have maintained since 1999 that the 
Kosovo crisis constituted a purely internal matter, in which NATO had no legal 
right to intervene. As such, the legitimacy of the Hague Tribunal also has been 
called into question. (7) If these rumors are true, and Russian intelligence 
agencies facilitated the arrest, an interesting question arises; namely, what is 
Russia’s game? 
    
Since the overthrow of President Slobodan Milosevic, and the subsequent 
elections, first of Pedrag Markovic and then Boris Tadic to the Presidency, Serbia 
has been attempting to gain entry to the European Union. In 2004, Belgrade was 
told that its chances hinged on the willingness to hand over to the UN those 
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wanted for war crimes, (8) a demand that apparently still stands. If that is the 
case, realpolitik may be at the heart of Moscow’s machinations. 
    
Many of the newer members of the EU, including Poland, Hungary and the Baltic 
States, have—as a result of Soviet history, as well as recent provocative Russian 
actions—distanced themselves from Russia since the end of the Cold War. With 
the electoral defeat of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and the accession of the 
more critical Chancellor Angela Merkel, Russia’s list of allies in the EU is 
diminishing.  
    
It is inconceivable that Djordjevic’s whereabouts were revealed by the SVR 
without Putin’s knowledge. It is likely, therefore, that the General was handed 
over with a view to enhancing Serbia’s chances for EU entry. The Kremlin’s 
calculation likely was that if Serbia is eventually admitted, due to its cooperation 
with the Tribunal, Russia will once more have an ally—and therefore a voice and 
or a ‘vote’—at the “head table” in Brussels. 
 
FSB fears nuclear insecurity – or preempts a leak 
At the end of the Cold War, the United States in cooperation with countries of the 
former Soviet Union, launched the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program. This was designed to assist in the dismantling and securing of NBC 
(Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) weapons and installations across the former 
Soviet sphere. The program has since shifted to the goal of preventing the theft 
and resale of fissile materiel to undesirable third parties.  
    
According to a recent in-depth report in the British Independent, Russia’s nuclear 
dumps are in a state of such disrepair, that they pose a threat “worse than 
Chernobyl.”  Andreeva Bay, a storage site near Murmansk—the Northern Fleet’s 
base—for example, contains some 20,000 decommissioned fuel rods from (both 
attack and strategic missile) nuclear submarines, which are fixed to the roofs of a 
number of storage tanks. These tanks are eroding, causing the rods to drop to 
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the tanks’ floors, where they are being corroded by seawater. This reaction might 
eventually release hydrogen, which could be ignited by any spark. The ensuing 
explosion would spread radioactive fallout over thousands of miles. (9)  
    
The information sourced to The Independent comes from a top-secret report by 
ROSATOM (Russia’s Nuclear Agency),  “obtained” by Bellona, a Norwegian 
environmental agency. The document indicates that nuclear waste is in some 
cases stored in outdoor barrels on the Kola Peninsula. The uranium stored at 
Andreeva is enriched to between 30 and 40%, making it a prime target for 
terrorists seeking dirty bomb materials. Security for these barrels is provided only 
by a “chain link fence and a couple of guards,” such that “anyone who wants to 
can just walk in.” (10)  
    
On June 7t, FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev participated in the National Anti-
Terrorist Committee’s meeting in Moscow. Patrushev directly addressed the 
issue of nuclear security, claiming that Russia faced a renewed threat from 
terrorists “striving to gain access to weapons of mass destruction and the 
technologies for producing them.” (11) Patrushev noted that the FSB—under the 
rubric of the NAC—would launch a renewed program to check and enhance the 
security levels at “crucial facilities managed by the Defence Ministry, ROSATOM, 
ROSPROM and ROSKOSMOS, and located within ZATOs (closed administrative 
territorial formations).” (12)  
    
It is of course possible, that Patrushev’s statement and the leak of the 
ROSATOM document are coincidental. However, given the case of Aleksandr 
Nikitin – a former submarine officer charged with treason in 1996 for leaking 
documents about Russia’s nuclear sites to environmental organizations, (13) it is 
equally possible that the FSB discovered that the ROSATOM document had 
been leaked and sought to mitigate the public relations effect of its release by 
preemptively announcing a new security initiative. If the latter hypothesis is 
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correct, the FSB is likely already investigating yet another “espionage” incident – 
in which case, an arrest probably will soon occur. 
 
Litvinenko case:  FSB to investigate MI6 involvement  
    
Aleksander Lugovoi, an ex KGB and FSB officer, is the chief suspect in the 
murder last fall of Aleksandr Litvinenko. On 22 May, the British government 
formally announced its intention to request Lugovoi’s extradition from Russia. 
The Kremlin’s response was to reject any such move as unconstitutional, and 
therefore impossible. (14)  
    
Lugovoi has spoken publicly on two occasions since this announcement. On 31 
May, he gave a press conference in Moscow, during which he alleged that 
Litvinenko was a Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) double-agent, and that the 
MI6 also had attempted to recruit Lugovoi himself. He claimed that Litvinenko 
had fallen out with his employers, had “slipped from their control, and they killed 
him.” (15)  
    
Two weeks later, Lugovoi conducted a further interview with Komsomolskaya 
pravda, in which he alleged that Berezovsky was also an MI6 agent, and 
repeated the Kremlin’s allegations that the oligarch also was involved in 
Litvinenko’s death.  
    
On June 18, the FSB announced that it would launch a major investigation into 
MI6 actions based almost entirely on Lugovoi’s information about “intelligence 
operations of British Special Services in the territory of Russia.” (16) British and 
Russian intelligence services undoubtedly have continued their operations 
against each other since the collapse of the USSR. Yet the current situation is 
something entirely different.  
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Moscow clearly views attack as the best form of defense. Litvinenko, according 
to the Kremlin’s theory, was little more than a pawn in a massive joint 
intelligence-political operation designed by MI6 to discredit and tar President 
Putin’s regime. (17) Russia meanwhile, continues to insist that Lugovoi will not 
be extradited, nor will a trial in a neutral country be allowed to occur. (18) 
Britain’s response to Lugovoi’s statements has been simply to reiterate that the 
Lugovoi case is a criminal, not an intelligence matter, and that an extradition is 
still required. (19) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) “The International Criminal Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia; The 
Prosecutor Of The Tribunal, Against Nebosja Pankovic, Vladimir Lazarevic, 
Vlastimir Djordjevic, Sreten Lukic. Indictment.” 22 Sep 03 via 
www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/pav-ii031002e.htm.  
(2) Ibid. 
(3) “War crime suspect 'in UN custody',” BBC News, 17 Jun 07 via 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6761059.stm. 
(4) “Ex-Serbian General Djordjevic Arrested Over Kosovo War Crimes,” RIA 
Novosti, 17 Jun 07 via www.en.rian.ru/world/20070617/67340915.html.  
(5) “Serbian TV Links Russian Spy Chief’s Montenegro Visit With Hague Arrest,” 
RTS SAT TV, Belgrade, in Serbian, 17 Jun 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(6) Ibid. 
(7) “Russian Duma Calls War Crimes Tribunal ‘Useless,’” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Europe Features Article, 15 Mar 06 via 
www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/03/0f407ac7-c23c-4085-b3a7-
4aa3e8cb9694.html.  
(8) “EU Entry Hinges on Generals’ Capture,” The Times of London, 18 Jan 05, 
via www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article413829.ece.  
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(9) “Worse Than Chernobyl: ‘Dirty Time bomb’ Ticking In A Rusting Russian 
Nuclear Dump Threatens Europe.” The Independent, 10 Jun 07 via 
www.news.independent.co.uk/europe/article2640425.ece . 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) “National Antiterrorist Committee Meeting Hears WMD Warning,” Gazeta, 6 
Jun 07 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(12) Ibid.  
(13) “Despite the Court's rejection of the seventh indictment against him, 
Aleksandr Nikitin remains on trial,” Bellona Environmental Agency, 30 Oct 1998 
via www.bellona.org/english_import_area/casefile/1140457712.06.  
(14) See ISCIP Update, Volume 1, Number 3, 4 Jun 07.  
(15) “Lugovoi Says Litvinenko Was British Spy,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Features Article, 31 May 07 via 
www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/5/7E9DC1E6-5BFE-4C1B-9636-
EC156A636309.html.  
(16) “Kremlin Determined to Tar MI6 in Litvinenko Cold War,” The Times of 
London, 16 Jun 07.  
(17) “Lugovoi: Limonov and Kasyanov Had Better Hire Bodyguards,” 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, 15 Jun 07; What The Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis.  
(18) “Russian Public Chamber Rules Out Lugovoi’s Trial In A Third Country,” 
Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 10 Jun 07; BBC Monitoring via 
Lexis-Nexis.  
(19) “FSB Probes Britain in Spy Flap,” The Moscow Times, 18 Jun 07 via Lexis-
Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Alexey Dynkin 
 
Russia rejects Sarkozy plan for Kosovo 
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At a United Nations Security Council meeting on Wednesday, June 20, Russia 
rejected a recently proposed draft resolution of the Kosovo conflict. The draft was 
originally presented by France's newly-elected president Nicholas Sarkozy as a 
compromise between the Serbian and Russian position, on one hand, and the 
Kosovo Albanian position, on the other, and has been accepted by the United 
States and the European Union. It allows for another four months of negotiations 
between the Belgrade and Pristina governments, after which, if an agreement 
cannot be reached, the plan initiated earlier this year by UN Special Envoy Martti 
Ahtisaari is to be implemented.  Ahtisaari's plan calls for Kosovo's independence 
under international supervision. (1) In addition, the draft contained several more 
provisions aimed at placating the Russian and Serbian side, such as the 
inclusion of a special envoy to oversee the return of ethnic Serbian refugees to 
Kosovo. (2) The supposed compromise, however, failed to change the Russian 
position. "We will not work on this draft," Russian UN Ambassador Vitali Churkin 
said. "We continue to maintain our position stated in the document that is sitting 
on the UN Security Council's table" – meaning, as Russian Emergency Minister 
Sergei Shoigu said two days later in a meeting with Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk 
Jeremic, that “this issue must be resolved in direct negotiations between 
Belgrade and Pristina." (3)  "The new draft of the Kosovo resolution,” said 
Churkin, “brings us no closer to a platform that could be used to reach an 
agreement [on Kosovo]." (4) 
 
Russia’s refusal to accept the Sarkozy-initiated “compromise” on Kosovo is 
predictable and, in a sense, justifiable. Explaining the Russian response, Churkin 
said that "this in my mind is not good enough, because such kind of formula is 
not going to provide sufficient incentive for the two parties to negotiate seriously." 
(5) In other words, giving Belgrade and Pristina another four months to negotiate, 
but then saying that if negotiations fail than Pristina will gain independence 
anyway, is hardly a compromise – it is, rather, a way of putting pressure on one 
side only, while giving the other no reason to negotiate at all, and allowing it 
simply to wait until the issue is resolved in its favor by external forces. Given its 
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rather obvious nature, it is unlikely that Sarkozy did not understand this fact when 
he proposed the idea, which suggests that his primary motive was finding a 
formula for the Russians to save face, while acceding to a UN-mandated solution 
to the Kosovo conflict. If that is the case, then this first attempt of the new French 
president to engage Russia demonstrates a lack of appreciation on his part for 
the reality of Russian foreign policy under Putin. 
 
Sarkozy’s stance is certainly understandable. Speaking from a European 
position, he appears to be working from the specifically European assumption 
that it is in everyone’s interest to resolve the Kosovo impasse as soon as 
possible; that, in the words of Ahtisaari, “Kosovo’s current state of limbo cannot 
continue…” because “…denying or delaying resolution of Kosovo’s status risks 
challenging not only its own stability but the peace and stability of the region as a 
whole.” (6) This is hardly surprising, given that the bulk of the peacekeeping task 
in Kosovo is currently undertaken by member states of the European Union (the 
total number of US military personnel deployed in Kosovo in September 2006 
was only 1,721 out of a total of 16,000 NATO troops under KFOR (7), while the 
Russian peacekeeping contingent has been withdrawn altogether), and given 
that the EU long term goal is a unified Europe, which eventually would  include 
such former trouble spots as the Balkans. It is not, however, an assumption that 
is necessarily shared by Russia. On the contrary, several factors make a hasty 
permanent solution to the Kosovo problem undesirable from the perspective of 
current Russian foreign policy. 
 
The most important of these considerations is the fact that the present status of 
Kosovo, with its so-called impasse, was brought about without Russia’s 
participation, indeed against Russia’s vehement objections, as a result of a 
military intervention by NATO, led by the United States. During that time, those 
who saw a need for an external military intervention in the Kosovo conflict were 
able to bypass Russian opposition by carrying out the military action without UN 
authorization, which would have been impossible due to Russia’s permanent 
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membership on the Security Council and its inevitable veto. The fact that the 
United States and its European allies were able to do this and that Russia was 
powerless to prevent it caused bitter resentment within the Russian political 
leadership, particularly among those who still envision a global role for Russia. 
But, military action is one thing; recognition of an independent country is a 
different matter, and more difficult outside the UN framework. While it is possible 
for the United States, along with the EU and other countries, to recognize Kosovo 
unilaterally as an independent state, Russia's objection would ensure that it could 
never become a UN member state: membership in the UN requires approval of 
the General Assembly, upon recommendation by the Security Council. (8)  
 
Moreover, the refusal of Russia and other countries such as China—not to 
mention Serbia itself—to recognize an independent Kosovo would prolong the 
region’s “in limbo” status. And, from the perspective of the European Union, 
creating an independent country without UN approval would be highly 
problematic – as columnist Fyodor Lukyanov points out, the EU is an 
organization that can function only under the auspices of international law and 
legitimacy, which in this case requires a UN-approved settlement of the Kosovo 
problem. (9) All of these factors give Russia significantly more leverage than it 
had when NATO launched its military intervention.  This means that Russia is 
more likely to delay any settlement and prolong a situation in which its voice 
counts, rather than contribute to a resolution which would put an end to its 
opportunity for leverage, and to which Russia has been opposed all along – that 
is, the separation of Kosovo from Serbia in some form, without Serbia’s approval.  
 
There is also the question of precedent: throughout the discussion on the future 
status of Kosovo, there has been the fear that if Kosovo does become 
independent, Russia will use it as a precedent to declare independent the 
separatist regions that it supports—Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, 
Transdniestr in Moldova—and then perhaps incorporate them into its own 
territory. Such a fear was recently raised by Assistant Secretary of State for 
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European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried before the US Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Washington, (10) as well as at a recent US-Russia 
conference chaired by head of the Duma committee for international affairs, 
Konstantin Kosachev, and House Committee on Foreign Affairs chairman, Rep. 
Tom Lantos. (11) According to Lukyanov, however, these fears are unfounded 
because it is not in the Kremlin’s interest at the moment (with other things to 
worry about, such as the upcoming elections) to create a situation where 
pressure would be put on Moscow from the leaders of the separatist regions to 
recognize their independence. (12) Moreover, the precedent could prove a very 
dangerous one for multi-ethnic Russia itself, in the long term. Kadyrov’s 
Chechnya may appear relatively stable at the moment, but there is no guarantee 
that his loyalty to Moscow will remain consistent with the growth of his power – or 
that Islamist separatism now active in Dagestan will not grow and spread 
throughout neighboring regions of the North Caucasus. It is more likely, then, that 
Russia’s preferred state of affairs is to maintain an impasse on the status of 
Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestr – a state of affairs that gives 
Russia maximum leverage without being forced to make decisions that may 
result in a new international crisis. 
 
In the meantime, however, it appears that Putin’s new Russia, the energy 
superpower, is already exploring alternative routes into its former Balkan sphere 
of influence. On Sunday, June 24, Putin attended a conference in Zagreb, 
Croatia, where energy cooperation among the countries of southeastern Europe 
was discussed. "Russia, as a global leader in oil and natural gas production is 
ready to do everything possible to resolve energy problems in the [Balkan] 
region," declared the Russian president at the summit, voicing support for the 
construction of a new oil pipeline under the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria 
and Greece and proposing Russian assistance for the construction of nuclear 
power plants in several Balkan states. (13) Perhaps whatever influence Russia 
can no longer maintain either with tanks or through the UN, it can reassert with 
its oil and gas. If that is the case, then the status of Kosovo, and, more broadly, 
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the idea of national sovereignty, may gradually lose their importance for Russia. 
Until then, however, Russia can be expected to delay a permanent settlement for 
Kosovo for as long as possible. Being in limbo, as Ahtisaari puts it, serves Russia 
just fine. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Gates and Boucher visits to Kyrgyzstan produce muted reaction 
Following a visit to Afghanistan, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates stopped in 
Bishkek on 5 June, in order to meet with Kyrgyz Defense Minister Ismail Isakov 
and President Kurmanbek Bakiev, as well as to visit the US-leased Manas air 
base.  The defense secretary’s main objective for the visit was to bolster Kyrgyz-
US ties by reaffirming US support for Kyrgyzstan in the NATO-led effort to 
stabilize Afghanistan, as well as in global endeavors to rein in terrorist networks.  
During a joint press conference with Gen. Lt. Isakov, Gates stated “I think what is 
important for the people of Kyrgyzstan to understand is that our use of Manas is 
in support of a larger war on terror in which Kyrgyzstan is an ally of virtually every 
other nation on earth.” (1)  He did not provide many details about his discussions 
with the Kyrgyz defense minister, other than to say, “We discussed our bilateral 
military relations and our opportunities for expanding that relationship.” Gates 
told journalists that US relations with Kyrgyzstan were positive, while Isakov 
simply stated that their discussion had been very successful.  Gates’ sole 
comment regarding the US Air Force’s lease agreement for the Manas base was 
succinct, but pointed: “The arrangements that we have at Manas are similar to 
those that other nations have who have military forces here in Kyrgyzstan, I think 
that seems appropriate.” (2)  Currently, Russia is the only “other nation" that 
maintains a military base on Kyrgyz territory. 
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Kyrgyz criticism of the US military presence at the Manas base has been fierce in 
recent months, assailing the air force personnel’s immunity from criminal 
prosecution by the Kyrgyz courts and the environmental damage caused by 
alleged incidents of jet fuel dumping. (3)  Assertions by Kyrgyz MP Rashid 
Tagaev that a US air strike against Iran will be launched from Manas, thereby 
making Kyrgyzstan vulnerable to a counterattack added more fuel to the fire of 
anti-US sentiment, (4) not to mention media pundit Leonid Bondarets’ comments 
that the base could attract terrorist attacks and that US servicemen are involved 
in narcotics trafficking. (5)  Even the payment terms contained in the new lease 
agreement (which was renegotiated in summer 2006) have become a point of 
controversy, with a number of Kyrgyz officials claiming that no payments have 
been received, (6) despite Finance Minister Akylbek Japarov’s report to 
parliament on 22 January that US$4.35 million had been received in December 
2006 as part of the new contract. (7) 
 
Gates’ visit seems to have done little to win over the US critics within the Kyrgyz 
government – the anti-US rhetoric seems to have abated somewhat, but there 
are few new signs of support for the US air base.  President Bakiev’s reaction to 
the defense secretary’s visit seemed lukewarm and his comments at the press 
conference following their meeting could hardly be considered effusive.  On the 
topic of the US air base at Manas, he stated: “Kyrgyzstan is strictly adhering to 
the obligations it has taken on within the framework of the efforts of the 
international counter-terrorism coalition…The two countries' cooperation is based 
on principles of mutual respect and fulfillment of the obligations the two sides 
have undertaken. Without doubt, Kyrgyzstan has made a significant contribution 
to the task of stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan.” (8)  He did not address the 
issue of whether or not the lease agreement for the base will be renewed a 
second time, or even whether he supports parliament’s demand that the 
agreement be reviewed. 
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US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher’s 
visit to Bishkek just two days later was only a little more successful than the 
defense secretary’s trip.   In fact, Boucher’s presence drew a small anti-US 
demonstration of roughly 15-20 persons, all members of a recently organized 
movement advocating the expulsion of the US air base from Kyrgyz territory. (9)  
During his meeting with President Bakiev, Boucher discussed further expanding 
US-Kyrgyz cooperation in a number of areas, including security, the economy, 
and political reform, (10) all fairly standard and predictable topics of conversation.  
However, when asked about Russian efforts to compel Kyrgyzstan to close the 
Manas air base at a press conference later that day, the Ass’t. Secretary of State 
did not mince his words: “One must ask, in the first place, the Russian side about 
this. We are constantly holding dialogue with the Russian side on the need to 
cooperate and to make efforts in order to ensure stability in the region and in 
Afghanistan in particular. They say time and again that they (Russia) want 
stability in Afghanistan. Therefore, I do not see any reason for Russia to try to 
stop our activities in Kyrgyzstan, in Germany, France or in other countries.”  He 
further stated: “The region's countries are deciding on their own what contribution 
they want to make to the stabilization of the situation, be it in the area of security, 
economics or politics….In view of this, Kyrgyzstan's independence consists in 
using all these opportunities and preventing a particular country, a trade partner 
or other external factors from establishing superiority over the country.” (11) 
 
Boucher also met with one of the US air base’s most vocal critics, Parliament 
Speaker Marat Sultanov, who, in deference to the Ass’t Secretary of State, 
modified his rhetoric just slightly, declaring that the US Air Force must abide by 
all of the lease agreement’s terms and limits, rather than repeating his previous 
demand that the contract be reevaluated with a view toward the base’s closure.  
Sultanov also emphasized that the base can not be used in any US military 
operations against Iran and that parliament will be considering the issue of the 
base’s existence at a later date.(12)  Boucher, for his part, agreed that the issue 
should be decided by Kyrgyzstan’s government, but that it has no place on the 
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agenda of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit: “The issue of 
the US air base in Kyrgyzstan should not be discussed at a SCO summit since 
the base is a component of cooperation between the USA and Kyrgyzstan, which 
is supported by the relevant agreement. There is no need for a third side to 
intervene in the issue.”  (13) 
 
Both Gates and Boucher defended US interests in Kyrgyzstan without making 
any concessions to the Kyrgyz government regarding US use of the Manas air 
base.  Gates attempted a slightly more conciliatory tone than Boucher used, by 
repeatedly stressing the positive aspects of Kyrgyz-US military cooperation, but 
neither he nor Boucher was able to elicit much enthusiasm from the Kyrgyz 
government, much less any concrete promises regarding the Manas base or 
Kyrgyz-US cooperation.  The only official who seemed genuinely interested in 
strengthening relations with the US was Prime Minister Almaz Atambaev, who 
sought Boucher’s help in gaining access to the Afghani trade market, as well as 
to international tenders for the rebuilding of Afghanistan’s infrastructure.  
Atambaev requested US aid in exporting surplus electricity to Afghanistan and 
also asked that his country be included in the Millennium Challenges program.  
He even appealed to the US government for assistance with the further 
development of Kyrgyzstan’s domestic politics, requesting that the US review 
President Bakiev’s recently submitted constitutional amendments, in order to 
ensure that they are in line with the process of democratic reform. (14)  Should 
Atambaev manage to retain his post as prime minister after the conclusion of the 
SCO summit in mid-August, his overtures to Boucher may provide at least a 
small ray of hope for future US-Kyrgyz relations.  At the moment, however, he 
appears to be one of a very small number of Kyrgyz politicians who supports the 
expansion of relations with the US.  It is not likely that President Bakiev’s true 
intentions vis à vis the US, Russia and China will be revealed until after the 
summit.  Both the Russian and Chinese governments have indicated interest in 
widening their ties with Kyrgyzstan on a number of levels, but the SCO summit 
may prove to be the real litmus test of their promises and kind words to Bakiev.  
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On the other hand, if Atambaev remains in power, the US may have one last 
chance to improve its track record in Central Asia, by allowing Kyrgyzstan to play 
a greater role in the rebuilding of Afghanistan, a move which could benefit to the 
region as a whole, creating new trade markets and revenue and perhaps even 
furthering the cause of Afghani political stability as a by-product. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
Is Ukraine’s Opposition Truly United? 
In recent days, there have been several troubling signs about the long-term 
“unity” of Ukraine’s pro-presidential opposition forces, the Our Ukraine and Yulia 
Tymoshenko Blocs.  Despite an agreement concluded months ago that the two 
blocs would work together and coordinate their actions, Ukraine’s media have 
printed several unattributed statements from supposed members of both forces 
suggesting that, after the election, all bets are off. 
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The root of the problem may be continuing disagreements within President 
Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine over the direction of the bloc.  In particular, tension 
appears to remain in the bloc between those few members who are working 
toward an agreement with Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions 
in order to facilitate business interests, and the majority of members who view 
any agreement with this party as a betrayal of the voters.  This tension 
repeatedly has paralyzed the party in the past, and it is essential that it not occur 
again.  
 
The latest sign that all disagreements have not been resolved within Our Ukraine 
came less than two weeks ago.  Yuriy Lutsenko, former Interior Minister and now 
head of the People’s Self-Defense organization, claimed that negotiations with 
Our Ukraine to create a coalition for contesting the upcoming parliamentary 
elections are stalled.  Lutsenko counts on the support of about five percent of 
voters and months ago announced his intention to unite with Our Ukraine.   
 
Lutsenko suggested that People’s Self-Defense may enter discussions with “our 
potential parliamentary ally, The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYUT),” should 
negotiations with Our Ukraine fail.  Specifically, he is pushing for an agreement 
on candidacies for the posts of parliamentary speaker, prime minister and the 
security ministries in any future government involving PSD.  “Voters should know 
that when voting for a certain political force they choose a definite speaker and 
prime minister,” he said.  (1) 
 
Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, slated to be among the top five of Our 
Ukraine’s electoral list, responded quickly.   He urged Lutsenko to “step back 
from the language of ultimatums.”  (2) 
 
To be sure, Lutsenko is adept at creating what Ukrainians call “media 
sensations,” and his statements must be viewed within the prism of the ongoing 
negotiations process.  However, Hrytsenko’s response sounded worryingly 
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similar to language used in the past by Our Ukraine when the bloc’s internal 
divisions kept it from coming to terms with potential allies.  
 
Most recently, this occurred following parliamentary elections in 2006 when the 
bloc’s business members opposed the idea of any type of coalition with Yulia 
Tymoshenko.  
 
At that time, BYUT, Our Ukraine and their then-ally Socialist Party had won 129 
seats, 80 seats and 33 seats in the 450 seat assembly, respectively.  This 
coalition should have allowed the long-time partners to form a government.  
 
But when Tymoshenko attempted to assert her right to the premiership, based on 
her bloc’s first place finish in the coalition, she was admonished for issuing 
“ultimatums.”  “The talks will realistically not begin until the ultimatums stop,” said 
then-Our Ukraine leader Yuriy Yekhanurov.   In the end, delays in reaching an 
agreement allowed Yanukovych to gain the upper hand.  (3) 
 
In fact, in Ukraine, whenever the term “ultimatum” has been applied by political 
parties, it has signaled a lack of support for a stated position.  Lutsenko, seeing 
Hrytsenko’s comment, must understand this, even though the well-respected, 
reformist head of Our Ukraine, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, continues to work hard for 
an agreement.  
 
The bigger question raised by these developments is their implication for a long-
term coalition between Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc.  Are the 
lengthy negotiations with Lutsenko simply the result of problems peculiar to that 
situation?  Lutsenko’s electoral support appears to be half of Our Ukraine’s.  
Perhaps he is asking too much?  Or are his positions on the need to implement 
significant reforms too much for some?  If the latter, this does not bode well for 
cooperation with Tymoshenko, whose positions are similar to Lutsenko’s in this 
regard.  
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With the defection of the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs from Our 
Ukraine to Yanukovych, it had been hoped that the tension between the 
“business wing” and what has become known as the “democratic wing” would be 
resolved.  However, an inability to come to an agreement with Lutsenko would 
suggest it hasn’t.  
 
Most recently, one of Ukraine’s most democratic, professional and least 
personally ambitious politicians, Mykola Katerynchuk, expressed his concern that 
Our Ukraine may choose in the end to form a coalition with the Party of Regions.  
Katerynchuk left Our Ukraine in August 2006, after President Yushchenko 
nominated Yanukovych for the premiership and a number of Our Ukraine 
members voted to confirm the nomination.   He is now a member of People’s 
Self-Defense.   
 
The possibility that People’s Self-Defense will go to the elections separately is 
significant.  Either way, Lutsenko’s forces look to be able to enter parliament.  
But for the possibility of a renewed “orange” government, three forces running 
separately may lead to defeat in the end.  
 
Some advocates for keeping Lutsenko out of their Our Ukraine suggest that he 
may pull votes from BYUT, lessening its expected margin of victory over Our 
Ukraine.  This seems unlikely. 
 
To date, opinion polls show little movement from BYUT to Lutsenko.  
Additionally, there has been little negative response to Tymoshenko’s decision to 
run separately, perhaps because Our Ukraine has failed to keep agreements with 
her in the past.  Her force’s base appears strong and consistent.  In essence, she 
won’t lose from campaigning independently and she won’t gain from taking on a 
partner.  She seems to have earned the luxury to simply sit back and watch the 
Our Ukraine-Lutsenko drama unfold. 
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But Our Ukraine – which has been fighting to maintain its voter base – will suffer 
should an agreement with Lutsenko fail.  With Lutsenko, the bloc may reach 18-
20%.  Without him, it may not even match the 14% of 2006.  This loss in votes 
would need to be overcome by BYUT and PSD.  In an election where the 
majority may be formed by a difference of 1-2%, and where voter apathy will be 
high, this is a very tall order. 
 
This is a key moment for the president’s party.  Some of the country’s most 
dedicated reformers remain in the bloc, and the next few weeks will determine 
whether they have successfully rid the party of those opposed to reform.  It is 
also a key moment for Lutsenko.  His ambition must not stop him from creating 
the best foundation possible for winning a majority.  
 
Failure to reach an agreement would signal problems for a potentially new 
“orange” government, following the election.  How will Our Ukraine and Lutsenko 
agree to form a coalition with Tymoshenko – should they be given that 
opportunity by voters – if they can’t complete their own negotiations 
successfully? 
 
Negotiators have given 1 July as a deadline to complete their discussions.  It is in 
the interest of both sides to succeed. 
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